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Abstract Perhaps the most common form of cooperation
among primates is the formation of coalitions. Competi-
tion among males within a group concerns a constant
quantity of the limiting resource (fertilizations). Contest
competition over fertilizations is known to produce pay-
offs that are distributed according to the priority-of-access
model, and hence show an exponential decline in payoff
with rank. We develop a model for rank-changing, within-
group coalitions among primate males. For these coali-
tions to occur, they must be both profitable (i.e. improve
fitness) for all coalition members and feasible (i.e. be able
to beat the targets). We assume that the value of the
coalition is the sum of the payoffs of the partners in their
original ranks. We distinguish three basic coalition con-
figurations, depending on the dominance ranks of the
coalition partners relative to their target. We predict five
basic coalition types. First, all-up, rank-changing coali-
tions targeting individuals ranking above all coalition
partners; these are expected to involve coalition partners
ranking just below their target, concern top rank, and be
small, just two or three animals. Second, bridging, rank-
changing coalitions, where higher-rankers support lower-
rankers to rise to a rank below themselves; these are ex-
pected to be most common where a high-ranking male in
a despotic system can support a low-ranking relative.
Third, bridging non-rank-changing coalitions; these are
expected to be common whenever high-ranking males
have low-ranking close relatives. Fourth, non-rank-
changing coalitions by high-rankers against lower-rank-
ing targets; these are expected to serve to counteract or
prevent the first type. Fifth, non-rank-changing, leveling
coalitions, in which all partners rank below their target
and which flatten the payoff distribution; these are ex-
pected to be large and mainly involve lower-ranking
males. Bridging, rank-changing coalitions are expected in
situations where contest is strong, all-up rank-changing
coalitions where contest is intermediate, and leveling
coalitions where contest is weak. We review the empirical
patterns found among primates. The strong predictions of
the model are confirmed by observational data on male-
male coalitions in primates.
Keywords Coalitions · Competition · Males · Primates ·
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Introduction
Where animals can exclude others from limiting re-
sources, competition among them is said to be by contest
(Nicholson 1954), and animals are expected to fight over
access to these resources. If these animals live in groups,
contest competition among group members will lead to
decided dominance relationships among them and a
usually linear dominance hierarchy in the group. When-
ever decided dominance relations are found, there is the
potential for coalitions (van Schaik 1996). Coalitions are
coordinated attacks by at least two individuals on one or
more targets, often preceded by signaling between the
attackers (side-directed communication: de Waal and van
Hooff 1981; de Waal and Harcourt 1992).
In large primate groups containing multiple adults of
both sexes, males and females tend to compete over dif-
ferent limiting resources: food or shelter for females,
fertilizations for males. Although males compete for
matings, the object of competition is fertilization. In-
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creased matings during a female’s peri-ovulatory period
improves a male’s likelihood of achieving fertilization.
Males competing for access to fertilizable females in a
primate group face a constant-sum situation: coalition
formation does not affect the total number of fertilizations
in the group in a given period. This competition is de-
scribed by a priority-of-access model (Altmann 1962),
where the dominant male takes whatever he can monop-
olize, the second-ranking male takes whatever he can, and
so on down. If the contested resource is mating access, the
combination of a constant quantity of fertilizations over
which the males compete and priority of access produces
concave payoff (fitness) curves with dominance rank (see
van Schaik et al, in preparation, for a general introduc-
tion). We believe that the shape of this curve has im-
portant consequences for the presence of coalitions. In
this paper, we develop a general model for male-male
coalitions within primate groups (coalitions among fe-
males generally are not constant-sum and the payoff
curves are not universally concave; see van Hooff and van
Schaik 1992).
The benefits of within-group male-male coalitions can
be classified into two basic types. First, coalitions may
increase access to some limiting resource, without how-
ever changing the dominance ranks of the participants
(here called “leveling” coalitions). Second, a coalition
may improve the dominance ranks of its members, and
through that access to the limiting resource. Recently, we
modeled non-rank changing leveling coalitions among
primate males in a group (Pandit and van Schaik 2003). In
this paper, we propose a general model for both types of
coalitions in constant-sum situations (henceforth: con-
stant-sum coalitions), with a special focus on rank-
changing coalitions.
We stress that this model only concerns rank changes
due to coalition formation and not the dyadic rank
changes due to gradual changes in individual fighting
abilities. Note, too, that we use the term coalition in its
game-theoretical sense (Kahan and Rapoport 1984); from
the perspective of animal behavior we can call them
successful alliances, because they reflect relationship in
which repeated coalitionary interactions occur rather than
single interactions and assume that the goals are actually
achieved. These different terms do not affect the model
because costs and benefits are measured in the same units:
fitness components per unit time.
Methods
The model and its predictions
The general model has the following structure. We have a group of
N males. Individuals can be arranged in a linear dominance hier-
archy; and each individuali’s dominance rank di is associated with a
payoff according to an inverse exponential function with exponent
b, where 0<b1 is the environmentally determined degree of
despotism. This formalism was introduced by Pandit and van
Schaik (2003) and modeled after the priority of access (Altmann
1962). Thus, b approaches 1 in a situation where the dominant can
monopolize access to the limiting resource (absolute contest),
whereas it approaches zero when all males gain approximately
equal access (as in scramble). The value of b is determined by both
demographic factors (number of females), female reproductive
physiology (seasonality of breeding, duration of fertile periods, and
tendency toward synchronization of fertile periods) and female
behavior (preference for mating with dominant males, subordinate
males, or for promiscuity). Note that the absolute values of the
fighting abilities of the males involved are irrelevant: in any group,
males will be ranked according to relative fighting ability and will
acquire fertilizations according to the b and the number of fertile
females in a given period.
Here, we are asking under which conditions these coalitions are
viable, i.e. improve fitness (profitability) and are strong enough to
beat the target (feasibility). Profitability requires that the benefits of
improved rank exceed C, the cost of the formation and maintenance
of the coalition (in terms of risk of injury, energy expenditure and
stress), for at least one coalition member while at least compen-
sating the cost for other members. This cost involves the selection
of appropriate partners and the maintenance of an effective alliance
through continued proximity, as well as the risk of injury associated
with the actual fighting1. We will then examine whether these
coalitions are indeed the strongest coalitions in the group (feasi-
bility).
Both conditions of profitability and feasibility must be satisfied
simultaneously for coalitions to be viable, i.e. to be expected to
occur. The combined conditions determine where in bC space
coalitions are found and if so, whether they will be rank changing
or not.
We will now derive the general condition for profitability for
each member of the coalition. Let daibe the dominance rank of
individual i in the absence of coalitions.
Based on our previous work (Pandit and van Schaik 2003) we
assume that the payoff function of this individual is
xdai ¼ ð1 bÞ
dai1ð b
1 ð1 bÞNÞ: ð1Þ
Letdtibe the targeted rank, i.e. the rank individual i would oc-
cupy as a result of a successful coalition. We now derive the re-
lation between b and C, starting from the basic assumption of
individual rationality (Kahan and Rapoport 1984). Hence,
C < xdti  xdai ð2Þ
C < ½ð1 bÞdti1  ð1 bÞdai1ð b
1 ð1 bÞNÞ ð3Þ
and the coalition is profitable if condition 3 is satisfied for each
member in the coalition.
This condition (profitability) produces rank changing coalitions
if and only if the coalition is feasible (i.e. is stronger than its target).
We check the feasibility of coalitions for three different configu-
rations of coalitions, following the classification of Chapais (1995)
based on the relative ranks of the participants in the coalition and
their target: all-down, where targeted rank is below those of the
coalition partners; bridging, where some of the coalition partners
are below the targeted rank and some of them are above; and all-up,
where all coalition partners rank below the targeted rank (Table 1).
All-up, rank-changing coalitions
All-up, rank-changing coalitions are potentially profitable when-
ever inequality (3) is satisfied for the lowest ranking member of the
coalition, because under the priority of access model it is then also
satisfied for every member of the coalition. To assess the feasibility
of these coalitions we have to solve the problem of determining the
value of the coalition. This problem has two components. First, we
must decide whether the value of the coalition is the simple sum of
1 This cost differs from the various g’s used by Pandit and van
Schaik (2003).
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the values of its participants or some more complex function. We
opt for the simplest assumption and use linear superposition. Sec-
ond, we must determine which aspect of the individuals we need to
sum: fighting ability or payoff (which is a function of both fighting
ability and motivation). These two will generally be highly corre-
lated and (in the absence of coalitions) are expected always to show
a monotonic relationship. Both should be directly and monotoni-
cally related to dominance rank in the absence of coalitions.
Fighting ability will generally be very difficult to estimate, even if
experiments are possible. Payoff, on the other hand, can be esti-
mated by paternity analysis. Where the benefit of higher rank is
modest (i.e. b is relatively low), both payoff and fighting ability
will show very similar functional forms with rank. Hence, it makes
sense to use the easily estimated payoffs to evaluate the value of the
coalition. This is what Pandit and van Schaik (2003) did. We will
return to the possible errors introduced by this decision in the
discussion.
We can now calculate the condition for feasibility. Because in
this analysis we only compare payoffs of being in a particular rank
position there is no need to consider the individuals occupying each
rank (for inequality 3 that was necessary because we were com-
paring two different payoffs for the same individual). We can
therefore drop the index i from the payoff. We also incorporate cost
because the allies need to coordinate their attacks with great pre-
cision and need to be prepared to do so at all times, and hence at
some ecological and social cost. For simplicity, we assume that the
cost C we used to calculate profitability can also be used here. If
this assumption is not justified, the model loses its simplicity, but in
the limiting case of no cost for feasibility, we arrive at qualitatively
similar results.
Let the rank of the lowest ranking member of the coalition be p
and let the size of the coalition be m (Pandit and van Schaik 2003).
Hence, we write
Xp
r¼pmþ1
xr  mC > xt
Xp
r¼1
xr 
Xpm
r¼1
xr  mC > xt
Xp
r¼1
ð1 bÞr1 
Xpm
r¼1
ð1 bÞr1  1 ð1 bÞ
N
b
mC > ð1 bÞt1
1 ð1 bÞp
b
 1 ð1 bÞ
pm
b
 1 ð1 bÞ
N
b
mC > ð1 bÞt1:
ð4Þ
Therefore,
C < bð1 bÞ
t1
mð1 ð1 bÞNÞ 
ð1 bÞp
mð1 ð1 bÞNÞ þ
ð1 bÞpm
mð1 ð1 bÞNÞ
ð5Þ
Thus, condition (5) gives the relationship between C and b such
that coalitions are feasible.
Figure 1a shows a family of feasibility curves for all the
coalitions that target the top ranker in a group of ten and contain m
participants starting from the second ranker downward. All curves
are intersecting the b axis at b0.5, as proposed earlier for the case
of zero cost (Pandit and van Schaik 2003). Figure 1b shows a
family of profitability curves for coalitions in which every member
shifts one rank up. These curves are obtained for the lowest ranker
in the coalition because every other member of the coalition is
going to have higher profitability than this individual. Therefore
these curves represent the profitability region boundary.
For coalitions to be viable they have to be both profitable and
feasible. We are therefore looking for the area of overlap between
regions below the profitability boundary and the feasibility
boundary in the bC space. Figure 2a shows the maximum ad-
missible cost (Cmax) as a function of coalition size (m) for coalitions
targeting the top ranker and starting from second ranker downward.
The important result is that these all-up, rank changing coalitions
are expected to be small in size. This result is independent of the
size of the group (N). Figure 2b shows that as the highest-ranking
member of the coalition ranks further away from the target, here
always the top ranker in the group, Cmax comes down, albeit not
steeply. However, there is another, independent reason why all-up,
rank-changing coalitions should attack a target ranking immedi-
Table 1 Expected coalition
types and their feasibility and
payoff benefits
Coalition configuration Coalition type Feasibility Payoff benefit
All-down All-down, rank-changing Always Never profitable
Status quo maintaining Always Not examined
Bridging Bridging, rank-changing Always See condition (7)
Protecting Always Not examined
All-up All-up, rank-changing See condition (5) See condition (3)
Leveling See condition (5) < Benefit of all-up,
rank-changing
Fig. 1 a A family of feasibility curves for all-up coalitions. The
curves are obtained for a group of ten individuals and for coalitions
of sizes two, four, seven and nine involving the second-ranking
individual. b The family of profitability curves for the same four
coalitions
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ately above the highest-ranking member of the coalition. If the
target ranks multiple rank positions above the coalition members,
there will be several individuals who would be negatively affected
by this coalition and with whom the target can form a retaliatory
coalition and easily restore the status quo. The possibility of re-
taliatory coalitions also leads us to predict that cascading all-up,
rank-changing coalitions that go from the lowest ranking pair of
males step by step all the way to the top should never occur.
Finally, Fig. 2c shows for coalitions whose highest ranking
member always ranks one step below the target that as the target
becomes lower ranking Cmax becomes smaller. In other words, most
coalitions observed in a group should be about the top rank posi-
tions. To sum up, we expect all-up, rank-changing coalitions to be
small (sizes 2 or 3), target the top ranker, and involve individuals
ranking just below the top ranker.
All-up, leveling coalitions
In the region inside the feasibility boundary but outside the prof-
itability boundary, we do not of course expect any all-up, rank-
changing coalitions. However, in this region of lower b values, we
may expect leveling coalitions because the coalitions are strong
enough to beat the top ranker and thus gain temporary access to a
limiting resource (a fertilizable female) but do not generate suffi-
cient benefits to permanently change the rank position of the
coalition partners (due to low b). Leveling coalitions act to reduce
the effective value of b, thus equalizing payoffs of individuals of all
ranks. Thus, while these coalitions may not be profitable to change
ranks, they may benefit the partners in equalizing access to the
limiting resource.
Pandit and van Schaik (2003) developed a model for this kind of
all-up configuration. Interestingly, that model predicts that coali-
tions will be large and consist of mid to lower rankers, while also
targeting one of the highest-ranking males in the group. Figure 3
depicts the regions of the bC phase space where we expect all-up,
rank-changing coalitions, where we expect all-up, leveling coali-
tions, and where we expect other types of rank changing coalitions.
In the region where all-up coalitions are both feasible and profitable
we expect all-up, rank-changing rather than leveling coalitions
because the payoff benefits of rank change exceed the modest
payoff increase caused by the leveling action2.
Bridging, rank-changing coalitions
Bridging coalitions are always feasible but never profitable if de-
cisions are based on payoff differences. However, they may be
profitable if the higher ranker(s) derive(s) an indirect benefit from
raising the rank(s) of other coalition member(s). Such an indirect
benefit is most easily obtained through kin selection, i.e. the part-
ners are genetic relatives (alternatively, the lower ranker could
provide a highly valuable service to the higher ranker, but such a
situation will be very rare in nonhuman animals). Thus, we can
predict that when bridging coalitions are observed in nonhuman
primates they are always between genetic relatives.
Fig. 2 a The maximum admissible cost (Cmax) as a function of
coalition size (m) for all-up coalitions targeting the top ranker and
starting from the second ranker downward in groups of different
sizes. b The maximum admissible cost (Cmax) as a function of the
rank distance (D) between the highest ranking member in the
coalition and the target rank. c The maximum admissible cost
(Cmax) as a function of the target rank (t) for all coalitions of size
two in which the partners occupy adjacent ranks and the target
ranks directly above the top ranker in the coalition
Fig. 3 Different regions of Cb space for all-up coalitions. In re-
gion 1, coalitions are profitable but not feasible (in this region we
do expect bridging, rank-changing coalitions). In region 2, all-up,
rank-changing coalitions are both profitable and feasible. Hence,
we expect these coalitions, and therefore also all-down coalitions.
In region 3, all-up rank-changing coalitions are feasible but not
profitable. Hence, we expect leveling coalitions in this region (and
possibly all-down coalitions). In region 4, all-up (nor any other)
coalitions are neither profitable nor feasible, and therefore not ex-
pected
2 The payoff of the members of a leveling coalition increases due to
the flattening of the payoff distribution, technically described in the
parameter a (Pandit and van Schaik 2003)
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Individual rationality (see condition [3]) can never explain the
presence of bridging, rank-changing coalitions because the higher
rankers never gain in payoff (in fact they pay a finite cost of
coalition formation). Hence, to explain their presence we need to
redefine profitability. To do so we first introduce the concept of
coalitionary rationality (Kahan and Rapoport 1984). Coalitionary
rationality holds when the increase in the sum of the payoffs of the
coalition members is greater than the sum of the costs of coalition
formation, i.e.
mC <
Xm
i
xdti 
Xm
i
xdai : ð6Þ
Hence, according to coalitionary rationality individuals will
decide to form a coalition if their average net payoff increases. To
incorporate the effect of kinship we modify the condition for
profitability, as follows
DðrijÞ
Xm
i
xti 
Xm
i
xai
" #
> mC
or
ð1 DðrijÞÞ xti  xai
 
> C; ð7Þ
where
DðrijÞ ¼ 2mðm 1Þ
Xm
i¼1
Xm
j¼iþ1
rij ð8Þ
and rij is the genetic relatedness between the two individuals i and j.
If either one or both parts of condition (7) are satisfied forming a
coalition is profitable. If coalition members are non-kin, then
D(rij)=0 and the condition (7) is as before: condition (3). If in
contrast the two members are identical twins (i.e. rij=1; the maxi-
mum possible value), then D(rij)=1 and condition (7) becomes the
condition of coalitionary rationality. In other words, individual
rationality and coalitionary rationality become the same when the
coalition members are identical twins.
If the coalition has only two members, then we only need to
consider the profitability of the highest ranker as follows:
rij½xti  xai > C ð9Þ
and the condition is equivalent to classic nepotism (Hamilton
1964). Note that in this situation the D(rij)=rij.
We can refine our prediction if coalition formation involves
some finite cost to the high-ranking relative. It is easy to show that
the profitability of bridging rank-changing coalitions increases as
the ranks of the coalition members increases and they attack the
higher-ranker in a high b situation. Figure 4 illustrates the situation
for a group with three males, where the top-ranking male help his
third-ranking relative to beat the second-ranking male in the group.
It shows that these coalitions produce the greatest net benefit where
b is high and the coalition partners are high ranking. We therefore
expect bridging, rank-changing coalitions to be most common
where a top ranking male in a high b situation is aiding a relative
who ranks a few rank positions below him.
Other bridging coalitions
Protection of lower-ranking relatives against attacks by other males
can be seen as the non-rank-changing equivalent to the rank-
changing bridging coalitions just discussed. These bridging coali-
tions are of course always feasible. We expect them to be profitable
as well under a broad range of conditions. However, if they merely
serve to protect a lower-ranking relative against damaging attacks
by other males, this kind of defensive coalition would not qualify as
the equivalent to all-up, leveling coalitions. If, on the other hand,
this protection serves to improve this male’s access to limiting
resources without changing his rank, they are leveling. In practice,
it may be impossible to distinguish between these situations unless
the context is immediate competition for access to estrous females.
All-down coalitions
All-down, rank-changing coalitions are always feasible but never
profitable because none of the coalition partners would derive a
payoff benefit from changing rank. Hence, we do not expect to see
such coalitions, and if they are actually observed in nature, they
must serve a different function (other than changing ranks). Thus,
all-down coalitions may actually serve to maintain the status quo
among the males because all-up coalitions that challenge a high
ranking target can easily be defeated by a coalition of the target and
one or more males that rank between the target and the all-up
coalition. This obvious consequence of the model leads to further
predictions about the pattern in all-up, rank-changing coalitions
observed in nature: all-down coalitions involving the target of an
all-up, rank-changing coalition are impossible if this target ranks
immediately above the highest ranking member of the all-up, rank-
changing coalition (adjacent target). Any other all-up, rank-
changing coalition is vulnerable to defeat by an all-down coalition.
Thus, we predict that by far the most common all-up, rank-
changing coalitions will be aimed at adjacent targets, because that
will prevent the formation of potentially victorious all-down
coalitions.
This prediction can be refined as follows. We should not see all-
up, rank-changing coalitions that gradually work their way up the
hierarchy by successively targeting individuals ranking immedi-
ately above them, because the obvious counter strategy to this is for
higher rankers to consistently form preventive all-down coalitions
against any all-up, rank-changing coalitions in their group, thus
preventing cascading rank changes. This argument obviously also
leads us to predict that the only all-up, rank-changing coalitions in
groups should concern the group’s top rank.
Results
To compare the outcome of this model with real systems,
we first need to estimate the model parameters in real
situations. Since the dependence on C is not very critical,
we will discuss its nature and correlates elsewhere (van
Fig. 4 Profitability of bridging, rank-changing coalition for two
different values of relatedness
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Schaik et al., in preparation). Instead, we will investigate
estimation of b.
There are several ways in which b can be estimated.
For relatively small samples of infants, we determined
through simulation that the most reliable estimate is
through the proportion of infants sired by the top ranking
male (paternity concentration: van Noordwijk and van
Schaik 2004) rather than other possible estimates of b
(see van Schaik et al., in preparation). The relation be-
tween x1 and b is as follows:
x1 ¼ b
1 ð1 bÞN : ð10Þ
For small N, the discrepancy between b and x1 in-
creases at lower values b, but those are the very situations
in which N is expected to be larger (see Fig. 5 and van
Schaik et al., in preparation). Thus, given the increasing
availability of paternity estimates in the literature, this
procedure gives a simple way to estimate b.
Many studies do not report paternity concentration for
the same group at the time coalitions were studied. In those
cases, we looked for estimates of b from other studies of
the same population at another time (in the tables below
reported in square brackets), or studies of the same species
with similar group size and composition (in the tables
placed in parentheses). If no exact estimates were avail-
able, we classified b estimates in four classes: Low
(b0.25), medium (0.25<b0.5), high (0.5<b0.75), and
very high (0.75<b).
We attempted to do an exhaustive survey of the pri-
mate behavioral literature, although we have no way of
assessing the degree to which we succeeded. Several of
the published studies were difficult to use because they
reported coalitionary interactions without documenting
the outcomes; the model concerns coalitions (alliances)
that successfully reach their goal (changing dominance
ranks or acquiring access to a receptive female). More-
over, they also report on coalitions not covered by the
model, and sometimes they are difficult to separate (e.g.
coalitions against recent immigrants that can be consid-
ered unranked). Thus, only a portion of the empirical
literature can be used to test the predictions.
The main prediction for all-up, rank-changing coali-
tions was met among male primates (Table 2): all seven
cases we found were small (involving two individuals), in
all but one case targeted the top ranker, and involved
males ranking immediately below the target. Values of b
tend be medium to high, with data from captive popula-
tions tending to be higher than those from the wild. This
range is higher than predicted. We are not yet able to
evaluate negative evidence as well. However, as predicted
by the model, van Noordwijk and van Schaik (2001)
found that none of the males challenging for top rank in
their high-b situation were members of coalitions, al-
though various defensive coalitions (see below) were
observed.
The observational data were also entirely consistent
with the main prediction for bridging, rank-changing
coalitions (Table 3): all four cases we found involved top-
ranking males and three of the four were in high b situ-
ations. In one case, kinship among the challengers was not
known with certainty, but was suspected by the observers
before the actual coalition was observed (K. Jack, per-
sonal communication).
Pandit and van Schaik (2003) developed a model for
the all-up, leveling coalitions. The model did account for
the known features: leveling coalitions involve mid-to
low-ranking males who target a high-ranking, often top-
ranking, male. The model also predicts (and this was not
Fig. 5 Paternity percentage of top ranking male as function of b for
various group sizes
Table 2 All-up, rank-changing coalitions observed among male
primates (b estimates are taken from paternity studies compiled in
van Noordwijk and van Schaik 2004). Estimates of b from other
studies of the same population at another time shown in square
brackets, and from other studies of the same species with similar
group size and composition shown in parentheses
Species Partners Target Number of
males in group
b Captive
or wild
Source
Presbytis entellus 2+3 1 3 (High) C Curtin (1982)
Cebus capucinus 2+4 1 4 High W K. Jack, personal communication
Cebus capucinus 2+3 1 3 0.64–0.83 W E. Vogel, unpublished
Pan troglodytes 2+3 1 3 [High] C de Waal (1978)
Pan t. schweinfurthii 2+3 1 4 (Medium) W Nishida (1983)
Pan t. schweinfurthii 3+4 2 8 [Medium] W Riss and Goodall (1977)
Macaca sylvanus 2+3 1 3 Very high C Witt and Schmidt (1981)
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yet known before it was developed) that leveling coali-
tions occur in lower b situations. Table 4 shows these
values, and documents that this prediction also holds. All
observed cases were found in low- or medium-b situa-
tions.
A general prediction of the model is that the range of b
values in which all-up, leveling coalitions are found is
lower than that for all-up, rank-changing coalitions, which
in turn is lower than that for bridging, rank-changing
coalitions. Comparison of the three tables indicates that
this is indeed the case (Table 5), although the numbers are
as yet too small to allow statistical evaluation. It is in-
teresting to note that within each category, the captive
studies tend to have higher b values than studies in the
wild. If we restrict our comparison to studies of natural
populations, the fit with the model predictions is re-
markably tight.
Discussion
The model presented here considers coalitions in an en-
vironment where individuals (primate males in this case)
compete through priority of access in a constant-sum
situation. Based on feasibility (coalition is stronger than
the target) and profitability [coalition satisfies profitabil-
ity conditions (3) and (7)], we identified five basic classes
of coalitions (see Table 1): (1) status-quo maintaining, all-
down, non-rank changing; (2) rank-changing bridging,
always involving kin; (3) non-rank-changing bridging,
always involving kin; (4) all-up, rank-changing; and (5)
all-up, leveling, non-rank changing. This classification of
types of male-male within-group coalitions extends
Chapais’s (1995) classification.
This embarrassingly simple model makes a variety of
predictions about the features of different types of (suc-
cessful) male-male coalitions within primate groups that
were supported by empirical data. The only, and rela-
tively minor, mismatch between model and data is that we
found all-up, rank-changing coalitions in a broader range
of b conditions than expected. We had predicted that they
should not be found at b>0.5, but we did find some. This
mismatch suggests that our simple equation for the
strength of the coalition (see below) is too simple.
Nonetheless, the absence of all-up, rank-changing coali-
tions in situations with very high b indicates that the error
we made was not too serious. Moreover, the predicted
different ranges of b values for the different kinds of
coalitions (Table 5) are actually largely sustained by the
empirical data. This fit is even better if we limit the
comparison to field studies only. While it is easily seen
that captive studies tend to yield higher b values than field
studies, the upward shift of coalitions within each type
may suggest that males in captivity do not assess the
captive situation entirely correctly (see below).
It is important to highlight the model’s critical as-
sumptions. The first one is that the costs in the prof-
itability and feasibility criteria are the same. Perhaps they
are not. If we omit any mention of cost for feasibility,
then the feasibility curves become vertical lines in Figs. 1
Table 3 Bridging, rank-changing coalitions observed among male
primates (b estimates are taken from paternity studies compiled in
van Noordwijk and van Schaik 2004). Estimates of b from other
studies of the same population at another time shown in square
brackets, and from other studies of the same species with similar
group size and composition shown in parentheses
Species Partners Kin?
(ranks)
b Captive
or wild
Number of
males in group
Source
Macaca arctoides 1, 3 Y (Very high) C 3 Bernstein (1980)
Cebus capucinus 1, 3 Likely 0.64–0.83 W 4 Fedigan (2003)
K. Jack, personal communication
Alouatta seniculus 1, 3, 4 Y 0.95 W 4 Pope (1990)
Pan troglodytes 1, 3 Y [Medium] W 8 Riss and Goodall (1977)
Table 4 All-up, leveling coali-
tions observed among male
primates (b estimates are taken
from paternity studies compiled
in van Noordwijk and van
Schaik 2004). Estimates of b
from other studies of the same
population at another time
shown in square brackets, and
from other studies of the same
species with similar group size
and composition shown in
parentheses
Species Partners Target Mean
size
b Source
Papio cynocephalus Mid-low Top/high 2.12 [Medium] Bercovitch (1988);
No (1990)
Papio anubis Mid-low Top/high 2.85 (Low) Smuts (1985)
Pan troglodytes All below top Top 2.19 [Medium] Goodall (1986)
Macaca sylvanus Mid-low Top/high 2.35 0.16 Kuester and Paul (1992)
Macaca fascicularis Mid-low Top/high ? Low? Angst (1975)
Macaca fuscata Mid-low Top/high ? [Low] Koyama (1967)
Table 5 b -range of different kinds of coalitions. The entries in the
table refer to the number of studies, with the number of captive
studies added in parentheses. The b estimates are taken from Ta-
bles 2, 3, 4
No. of studies Low Medium High Very high
All-up, leveling 4 2
All-up, rank-changing 3 1 (+2) 0 (+1)
Bridging, rank-changing 1 1 1 (+1)
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and 3. This change does not qualitatively change our
predictions. However, because some sort of coordination
cost is bound to exist, predictions will inevitably converge
on the ones we obtained. In addition, C is considered a
constant, i.e. we average out all the terms in the cost as
just one constant. The reasons for doing this are its sim-
plicity and the difficulty of determining these terms sep-
arately in an experiment. The C used in this model refers
to the cost of forming and maintaining a long-term alli-
ance, unlike the g, the ad hoc measure of interaction-level
cost introduced by Pandit and van Schaik (2003) in their
model of leveling coalitions.
The second critical assumption, as noted above, is that
we estimate the value of a coalition as the sum of indi-
vidual participants’ values (payoffs) minus their cost.
This convention identifies motivation (expected payoff)
as the main component of coalitionary strength. It is
not entirely correct, as we had anticipated. We suggest
therefore that fighting abilities may still add up to feasible
combinations even in high b situations where the payoff
sum would no longer suggest feasibility. Unfortunately, it
is not easy to improve on this assumption, because it is
impossible to test experimentally the strength of a coali-
tion. Doing so would require the ability to provoke
coalitionary fights in any configuration desired by the
experimenter. Nonetheless, as noted above, the order in
which the different kinds of coalitions occur along the
range of possible b values is as predicted by the model.
It is clear that the critical variable in the model is b. Its
influence reaches beyond that of coalitions, however.
Indeed, we expect to see major differences between low-
and high-b situations, even within species. van Noordwijk
and van Schaik (2004) note that males in low b situations
tend to achieve top rank through a queuing or succession
process rather than through active challenges, as at high
b. They also tend to immigrate into groups with more
favorable adult sex ratios, whereas young males in high-b
situations tend to move to groups in which the demo-
graphic situation is such that future prospects of achieving
top rank are best (although older males fall back to the
low-b strategy). Male-female friendships may also differ
predictably with b (van Schaik et al., in preparation).
Finally, in low-b groups we expect less female-biased
adult sex ratios and no solitary males or males living in
all-male bands. Hence, the degree of which top males can
achieve full priority of access to females is an important
organizing variable for male socio-sexual strategies.
The success of the model raises a question whether
males assess the local situation or whether they use some
fixed rule that reflects the average b for the species. The
fact that we see some variation within species in different
conditions (see the Tables; Pandit and van Schaik 2003)
suggest some flexibility in the decision making. The im-
pact of b on many other aspects of male socio-sexual
strategies also suggests that males use rules that serve to
estimate the local b, and use the outcome to decide when
to look for possible coalition partners. Future research
may address the mechanisms used in this assessment. At
least, intraspecific comparisons are called for that exam-
ine male-male coalitions in a variety of b situations, e.g.
where group sizes and breeding seasonality vary. These
intraspecific comparisons may also help to confirm the
absence of coalitions, where they are predicted.
Obviously, many more coalitionary interactions take
place among males within a primate group and in a
constant-sum context than this model covers. As we al-
ready noted, however, some coalitions are consistent with
the model; for instance, the defensive or conservative (all-
down) coalitions can be regarded as serving to prevent
revolutionary rank-changing coalitions. More work is
needed to establish whether we should also expect
counter-coalitions to prevent leveling. On the other hand,
the model’s success also bodes well for attempts to extend
it to cover the two main remaining classes of male-male
coalitions: (1) coalitions against males that are unranked
(e.g. immigrants trying to take over the group) or males
whose fighting abilities are changing but who still occupy
the rank that corresponds to their earlier fighting ability;
and (2) coalitions against other coalitions, either within
the same group or in other groups (between-group coali-
tions).
In some species, male-male coalitions seem to be en-
tirely absent (e.g. lemurs: Pereira and Kappeler 1997).
The model ascribes the absence of male-male coalitions
in multi-male groups to (1) very high b values, or (2)
prohibitively high cost of coalition formation. Of course,
other unknown factors could also be involved. Species
with limited cognitive abilities may face a high cost of
coalition formation; the absence of coalitions in multi-
male groups of lemurs and many other animals might be
due to such a cognitive constraint. We hope that the ex-
istence of this model inspires researchers to examine
cases where coalitions are absent in large multi-male
groups.
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